Every estimate bent toward the budget.
No invented customers, no fake bank accounts. The Hertz errors lived in the most ordinary places on the balance sheet — and that is exactly the warning. The single largest restatement item was "subrogation": receivables for vehicle-damage recoveries from renters and insurers, offset by an allowance for amounts that wouldn't be collected. Cumulative misstatement: $48 million pre-tax. The SEC's order walks through how it happened. In May 2013, Internal Audit found a spreadsheet error whose proper fix would have added $7 million of expense; instead, the reserve methodology was rationalized so expenses rose by less than $1 million. During 2013, the subrogation methodology was changed on several occasions — and, in the SEC's words, each of the changes had a favorable impact on the company's financial statements, and each was not in accordance with GAAP. In the fall of 2013, in the middle of a senior-management "gap-closing" effort, some categories of receivables ended up reserved at an effective rate of roughly 4% — implying a 96% recovery rate far above actual experience.
The same pressure reshaped the fleet math. During 2013 Hertz quietly extended planned holding periods for much of its U.S. fleet — top models going from 20 months to 24 or 30 — which spread depreciation over more months and flattered current-quarter earnings, while the MD&A attributed falling depreciation expense to "improved residual values" and procurement efforts. And in November 2013, five weeks after lowering guidance, Hertz publicly reaffirmed the $1.68–$1.78 range even though internal estimates had fallen to $1.65–$1.66 and an internal analysis had found the revised guidance itself was partly built on methodological errors.
The restatement found seventeen areas of material accounting errors across the business — and the methodology changes along the way always moved income the same direction: toward the budget.
It unraveled in 2014, slowly and then all at once. The restatement, when it finally landed in July 2015 inside the 2014 Form 10-K, reversed $235 million of previously reported pre-tax income, disclosed eleven separate material weaknesses in internal control over financial reporting, and said the quiet part in writing: "an inconsistent and sometimes inappropriate tone at the top" had existed and may have contributed to the errors, misstatements and omissions.
September 26, 2013
Hertz cuts 2013 EPS guidance to $1.68–$1.78. Within weeks, internal estimates fall below the new low end; "gap-closing" efforts intensify.
November 4, 2013
Hertz reaffirms the lowered guidance despite internal projections of $1.65–$1.66 and an analysis showing the September revision was partly flawed.
May 13, 2014
Hertz announces it cannot file its Q1 2014 Form 10-Q — errors found in prior periods may force a restatement of 2011.
June 6, 2014
Audit committee concludes the 2011 financial statements can no longer be relied upon; investigation with independent counsel begins.
September 8, 2014
Hertz announces the departure and replacement of its CEO, weeks after replacing its lead independent director.
November 14, 2014
Hertz announces 2012 and 2013 must also be restated and should no longer be relied upon.
July 16, 2015
The Restatement. Filed within the 2014 Form 10-K: $235M of pre-tax income reversed across 2011–2013, 17 areas of material accounting errors, 11 material weaknesses, and an admission of an "inconsistent and sometimes inappropriate tone at the top."
December 31, 2018
SEC cease-and-desist order: Hertz settles fraud and reporting charges for a $16 million civil penalty, without admitting or denying the findings.